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The Death of Treaty Supremacy: An Invisible Constitutional Change 
David L. Sloss 
(Oxford Univ. Press, forthcoming 2016) 
 
Introduction 
When the Framers of the U.S. Constitution met in Philadelphia in 1787, they drafted a 
Constitution designed to ensure that States would not violate the nation’s treaty commitments. 
Before adoption of the Constitution, Alexander Hamilton noted, “the treaties of the United States 
. . . [were] liable to the infractions of thirteen different legislatures . . . The faith, the reputation, 
the peace of the whole Union, are thus continually at the mercy of the prejudices, the passions, 
and the interests of every member of which it is composed.”1 The Framers sought to rectify the 
problem of State treaty violations by vesting power over treaty compliance in the federal 
government. The draft Constitution sparked vigorous debates in the period from 1787 to 1789. 
No issue was more hotly contested than the balance of power between the States and the federal 
government. However, there was virtual unanimity on one point: the Constitution prohibited 
state government officers from violating national treaty obligations. The power to violate treaties 
belonged to the federal government, not the States. 
On August 5, 2008, the State of Texas executed José Ernesto Medellín. His execution 
violated the nation’s legal obligations under the UN Charter, the treaty that created the United 
Nations. President George W. Bush—a former Texas Governor who supports the death penalty 
and believes strongly in states’ rights—tried to block Medellín’s execution, precisely because it 
violated U.S. treaty obligations. However, the Supreme Court ruled in a case called Medellín v. 
Texas that President Bush could not prevent Texas from putting Medellín to death, even though 
the execution violated international law.2 The Supreme Court based its decision on an 
understanding of the Constitution that differed sharply from the Framers’ understanding. How 
did we arrive at a shared understanding that the Constitution permits States to violate some 
treaties, even though the Framers purposefully adopted a Constitution that barred States from 
violating any treaties? That is the central question addressed in this book. 
In addressing this question, I draw on a growing body of scholarship that explains 
constitutional change outside the courts, and outside the formal amendment process codified in 
Article V of the Constitution. Much of that literature celebrates constitutional change outside the 
courts as a democratic expression of popular sovereignty.3 To cite just one example, the 
women’s movement failed in its effort to promote adoption of the Equal Rights Amendment 
(ERA) through the formal Article V process, but succeeded in changing popular attitudes about 
gender discrimination. Those changed attitudes, in turn, gave rise to new federal legislation and 
key Supreme Court decisions that accomplished many of the goals of the women’s movement. 
That process has come to be known as the “de facto ERA.”4 
The central story line in this book is similar to the ERA story in one respect, but quite 
different in other respects. The “treaty supremacy rule” is codified in Article VI of the 
Constitution, known as the Supremacy Clause. The rule, as traditionally understood, provided 
that treaties automatically supersede conflicting state laws. The traditional treaty supremacy rule 
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served an important purpose: it helped ensure that state governments would not violate U.S. 
treaty obligations unless the federal political branches authorized them to do so. The United 
States ratified the UN Charter in 1945. Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter obligate the United 
States to promote “human rights . . . for all without distinction as to race.”5 In the late 1940s and 
early 1950s, human rights activists in the United States invoked the Charter’s human rights 
provisions, together with the Constitution’s treaty supremacy rule, to challenge the validity of 
state laws that discriminated on the basis of race or nationality. In 1950, in a case called Fujii v. 
California, a California court ruled in favor of human rights claimants, striking down a 
California law that discriminated against Japanese nationals because it conflicted with the 
Charter’s human rights provisions.6 The potential implications of that decision were shocking. If 
the court was right, the United States had effectively abrogated Jim Crow laws throughout the 
South by ratifying the UN Charter. That result was unacceptable to many Americans at the time. 
Responding to Fujii, conservatives mobilized support for a constitutional amendment, known as 
the Bricker Amendment, whose aim was to abolish the treaty supremacy rule. Like the feminists 
who failed to obtain passage of the ERA, but achieved some of their goals in other ways, 
proponents of the Bricker Amendment achieved some of their goals without a formal 
constitutional amendment. I refer to that constitutional transformation as the “de facto Bricker 
Amendment.”  
In contrast to the de facto ERA, the history of the de facto Bricker Amendment is not a 
story about the triumph of democracy and popular sovereignty. Rather, it is a story about 
invisible constitutional transformation. The results of the de facto ERA were codified in federal 
statutes and Supreme Court opinions—sources that were readily accessible to all interested 
American citizens. One did not need a law degree to understand the significant expansion of 
women’s rights that occurred in the 1970s. In contrast, most lawyers in the United States today 
are unaware that the Constitution’s treaty supremacy rule was dramatically transformed in the 
1950s. The substance of that transformation was initially expressed in American Bar Association 
(ABA) reports and Senate testimony by Eisenhower Administration officials in the early 1950s.7 
Later, the de facto Bricker Amendment was “codified” in the Restatement (Second) of Foreign 
Relations Law, a document published by the American Law Institute (ALI) in 1965.8 None of 
those sources were readily accessible to the American public. Moreover, neither the ABA nor the 
ALI exercises formal governmental authority.  
The de facto Bricker Amendment remained largely invisible because the results were 
expressed in technical legal jargon that obscured the magnitude of the constitutional change. 
Before 1950, the treaty supremacy rule was simple: all treaties prevail over conflicting state laws 
because the Supremacy Clause says so. By 1965, though, a new constitutional understanding had 
emerged—“self-executing” treaties prevail over conflicting state laws, but States are free to 
violate “non-self-executing” treaties. The distinction between self-executing (SE) and non-self-
executing (NSE) treaties has been a feature of U.S. constitutional law since the 1790s. According 
to the oldest version of self-execution doctrine, federal executive officials have the authority to 
implement SE treaties, but congressional legislation is needed to authorize the President to 
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implement NSE treaties. For example, if treaty implementation requires an expenditure of 
money, legislation is needed to authorize federal officials to withdraw funds from the U.S. 
treasury. Hence, the treaty is “non-self-executing” in that respect. Before 1950, treaty supremacy 
doctrine and self-execution doctrine were independent, non-overlapping doctrines. Treaty 
supremacy governed the relationship between treaties and state law. Self-execution governed the 
division of power over treaty implementation between Congress and the President. (Actually, 
self-execution doctrine was somewhat more complicated, but I will address those complications 
later.) The de facto Bricker Amendment expanded the scope of self-execution doctrine to 
encompass the relationship between treaties and state law. In the process, lawyers created the 
“NSE exception to the treaty supremacy rule.” The NSE exception allows state government 
officers to violate U.S. treaty obligations without authorization from the federal political 
branches. 
In this respect, the NSE exception is starkly at odds with one of the primary goals of the 
Constitution’s Framers. In the Federalist Papers, James Madison invited readers to consider the 
hypothetical case of a federal constitution that provided for the supremacy of state law over 
federal law. In that case, he said, 
[T]he world would have seen, for the first time, a system of government founded 
on an inversion of the fundamental principles of all government; it would have 
seen the authority of the whole society everywhere subordinate to the authority of 
the parts; it would have seen a monster, in which the head was under the direction 
of the members.9  
In certain cases, the NSE exception to the treaty supremacy rule places the head under the 
direction of the members. In Medellín v. Texas, the Supreme Court held that Article 94 of the UN 
Charter is not self-executing.10 The Court’s decision was based on the NSE exception to the 
treaty supremacy rule that arose from the de facto Bricker Amendment (although the Court 
claimed, incorrectly, that it was applying nineteenth century self-execution doctrine). As a 
practical matter, the Court’s decision meant that Texas was allowed to violate U.S. treaty 
obligations. Moreover, Texas’ actions meant that the federal political branches were forced to 
deal with the foreign policy consequences of a treaty violation that they did not authorize and 
that the President tried to prevent. This was precisely the type of situation that the Framers 
sought to avoid by codifying the treaty supremacy rule in Article VI of the Constitution.  
The de facto Bricker Amendment gained acceptance because the NSE exception to the 
treaty supremacy rule was responsive to widely shared sentiments about American constitutional 
identity. Americans have long believed that we have the best constitution in the world. I refer to 
this view as American exceptionalism. The Fujii decision (referenced above) threatened the 
popular faith in American exceptionalism. In Fujii, not only did the court hold that California 
law violated the UN Charter’s human rights provisions; it also held that the law did not violate 
the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause. The juxtaposition of those two holdings 
was impossible to reconcile with the widely shared faith in American exceptionalism. Most 
Americans in the early 1950s were not prepared to accept the notion that international human 
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rights law provided more robust protection against racial discrimination than did our own 
Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, at a time when the Fourteenth Amendment was generally 
understood to permit racial segregation, the NSE exception to the treaty supremacy rule served a 
useful purpose. Like other doctrines that are well known to lawyers, but that are generally 
unfamiliar to non-lawyers, the new NSE exception provided judges a convenient rationale for 
refusing to decide questions that they preferred to dodge. Specifically, it provided courts a 
rationale for refusing to answer the question whether the UN Charter prohibited forms of racial 
discrimination that the Fourteenth Amendment permitted.11 Thus, the NSE exception to the 
treaty supremacy rule helped preserve the public faith in American exceptionalism by enabling 
courts to dodge the uncomfortable question whether the UN Charter prohibited racially 
discriminatory laws and practices that were still pervasive in the United States in the 1950s. 
The legacy of the de facto Bricker Amendment continues today. The NSE exception to 
the treaty supremacy rule is still an entrenched feature of modern legal doctrine, although the 
precise contours of that exception are contested.12 Perhaps more importantly, the Bricker debate 
generated an atmosphere in which human rights treaties are seen as political poison. 
Consequently, the United States refuses to ratify most human rights treaties, and the treaties we 
do ratify include unilateral reservations and declarations designed to ensure that ratification does 
not affect human rights protection in the United States.13 The net result is that we cling to our 
faith in the superiority of the U.S. constitutional system, but domestic protection for human 
rights falls short of international standards.14 International human rights law provides a mirror 
that tells us who is “the fairest of them all.” Like the queen in Snow White, we do not like the 
answer, so we refuse to look in the mirror. NSE doctrine helps us avert our gaze from the 
unflattering answer that the mirror provides. 
 
The Substance of Transformation 
The substance of the constitutional transformation that occurred between 1945 and 1965 
can be summarized briefly in two sentences. Before 1945, the treaty supremacy rule was a 
mandatory rule. After 1965, though, the treaty supremacy rule was generally understood to be an 
optional rule. 
Article II of the Constitution grants the President the power to make treaties “by and with 
the advice and consent of the Senate.”15 I use the term “treaty makers” to refer collectively to the 
President and the Senate when they act together under Article II to make treaties. Article VI, 
Clause 2, of the Constitution, known as the Supremacy Clause, states in full: 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in 
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the 
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or 
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.16 
The treaty supremacy rule, as traditionally understood, consisted of two elements. First, all 
treaties supersede conflicting state laws. Second, state and federal courts have a constitutional 
duty to apply treaties whenever there is a conflict between a treaty and state law, because the 
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Supremacy Clause specifies that judges are “bound thereby.” Thus, the Supreme Court said in 
1909: “We do not deem it necessary to consider the constitutional limits of the treaty-making 
power. A treaty, within those limits, by the express words of the Constitution, is the supreme law 
of the land, binding alike national and state courts, and is capable of enforcement, and must be 
enforced by them in the litigation of private rights.”17 Similarly, more than a century earlier, U.S. 
Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase wrote: “That it is the declared duty of the State Judges to 
determine any Constitution, or laws of any State, contrary to that treaty (or any other) made 
under the authority of the United States, null and void. National or Federal Judges are bound by 
duty and oath to the same conduct.”18 Before 1945, no significant judicial, governmental, or 
scholarly authority claimed that Article II granted the treaty makers the discretion to opt out of 
the treaty supremacy rule. The treaty supremacy rule was understood as a mandatory rule, not an 
optional rule.  
In 1959, though, a preliminary draft of the ALI’s Restatement on Foreign Relations Law 
expressed a very different view. It said:  
The provisions of Art. VI, § 2 of the Constitution [the Supremacy Clause] under 
which treaties may be self-executing are in effect, permissive rather than 
mandatory. Therefore, not all treaties concluded on behalf of the United States are 
self-executing. . . . [A non-self-executing] treaty does not operate as a rule for the 
executive branch . . . or the States nor does an individual acquire rights under it 
until Congress has taken appropriate action to implement it.19 
Before 1945, self-execution doctrine established that some treaties are non-self-executing, 
meaning that legislation is needed to authorize federal executive officers to implement the treaty. 
Moreover, the doctrine established that Article II grants the treaty makers discretion to decide 
which treaties are self-executing and which ones are non-self-executing.  
The de facto Bricker Amendment expanded the concept of self-execution to address the 
relationship between treaties and state law. Before 1945, treaty supremacy doctrine and self-
execution doctrine were two independent doctrines. Treaty supremacy governed the relationship 
between treaties and state law. Self-execution governed the division of power over treaty 
implementation between Congress and the President. Thus, Quincy Wright (the leading scholar 
of constitutional foreign affairs law at the time) wrote in 1951: “the distinction between self-
executing and non-self-executing treaties has been used in American constitutional law only with 
reference to the agency of the Federal Government competent to execute the treaty and has had 
no reference to the relations between the Federal Government and the States.”20 By expanding 
the concept of non-self-execution to encompass the relationship between treaties and state law, 
the de facto Bricker Amendment effectively subsumed treaty supremacy doctrine within self-
execution doctrine. In the process, the treaty supremacy rule was converted from a mandatory 
rule to an optional rule, because it was generally agreed that Article II of the Constitution granted 
the treaty makers discretion to decide whether a particular treaty would be self-executing or non-
self-executing. The idea that the treaty supremacy rule is optional developed organically in the 
1950s in the context of debates over the Bricker Amendment and U.S. participation in the then-
emerging system of international human rights treaties. The ALI’s Restatement of Foreign 
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Relations Law consolidated the transformation by expressing the NSE exception to the treaty 
supremacy rule in a manner that was accepted as authoritative by lawyers and judges. 
 
The Rhetoric of Transformation 
Sometimes, lawyers and judges want to change the law without admitting that they are 
changing the law. They often use two different tools to achieve their goals. First, they cite 
judicial precedents as authority for legal claims, but reinterpret older precedents to support novel 
claims. Second, they employ familiar legal terms to express their ideas, but use those terms in 
new ways so that a legal term-of-art acquires a new meaning.21 The lawyers who created the 
NSE exception to the treaty supremacy rule employed both strategies. 
In modern parlance, lawyers and judges use the terms “self-executing” (SE) and “non-
self-executing” (NSE) to express three very different concepts. I refer to these as the 
“congressional-executive” concept, the “political-judicial” concept, and the “federal-state” 
concept. All three concepts share one common feature: federal legislation is necessary to 
implement an NSE treaty, but not to implement an SE treaty. The three concepts express 
different understandings as to why legislation is needed.  
Under the congressional-executive concept, an NSE treaty does not operate as a rule of 
conduct for federal executive officers unless Congress enacts implementing legislation. In 
contrast, federal executive officers apply SE treaties as law, and need not await legislative 
authorization to do so. Justice Brandeis expressed this concept when he said: “For in a strict 
sense the Treaty was self-executing, in that no legislation was necessary to authorize executive 
action pursuant to its provisions.”22 As discussed previously, treaties that require an expenditure 
of money are NSE in this sense of the term. Congressional-executive variants of NSE doctrine 
serve two purposes: they limit the President’s power to implement treaties that conflict with prior 
federal statutes and they preserve a role for the House of Representatives in creating federal laws 
to implement treaties. (Recall that the President makes treaties with the advice and consent of the 
Senate, but without House participation.) The congressional-executive concept dates back to the 
1790s. It was the dominant concept of self-execution before World War II. 
A different concept of self-execution arose in the nineteenth century. Under the 
“political-judicial” concept, SE treaty provisions are judicially enforceable, but courts may not 
apply NSE provisions unless Congress enacts implementing legislation. The Supreme Court 
applied the political-judicial concept in 1884 in The Head Money Cases.23 There, the Court said 
that “the judicial courts have nothing to do [with NSE treaties] and can give no redress.” 
However, SE treaties “are capable of enforcement as between private parties in the courts of the 
country.”24 Political-judicial variants of NSE doctrine prevent courts from deciding treaty-related 
issues in situations that require the exercise of political judgment in choosing how best to carry 
out U.S. treaty obligations. Under the political-judicial concept, unlike the congressional-
executive concept, federal executive officers have the authority to implement NSE treaty 
provisions, and need not await legislative authorization to do so. For example, federal executive 
officers do not need legislative authorization to implement an arms control treaty requiring the 
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destruction of certain types of weapons. However, courts would be reluctant to enforce such a 
treaty if an individual sued the President to remedy an alleged treaty violation. 
The federal-state concept of self-execution arose in the early 1950s in the context of 
disputes about U.S. participation in human rights treaties and judicial application of the UN 
Charter’s human rights provisions. Under the federal-state concept, an SE treaty supersedes 
conflicting state laws, but an NSE treaty does not supersede state laws unless Congress enacts 
legislation to implement the treaty. A California Supreme Court decision in 1952 was the first 
published judicial decision to apply the federal-state concept of self-execution. (This case was 
the appeal from the Fujii decision discussed previously.) In an opinion rejecting a claim based on 
the Charter’s human rights provisions, the court said: “A treaty . . . does not automatically 
supersede local laws which are inconsistent with it unless the treaty provisions are self-
executing.”25 As mentioned before, the federal-state variant of NSE doctrine served a useful 
purpose by providing a justification for courts to dodge the uncomfortable question whether the 
Charter’s human rights provisions offered stronger protection against racial discrimination than 
did the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Before World War II, lawyers and judges used the terms “self-executing” and “non-self-
executing” to express both the congressional-executive concept and the political-judicial 
concept, without distinguishing clearly between them. The fact that these terms had already 
acquired two very different meanings before 1945 may have made it easier for lawyers and 
judges after 1945 to stretch self-execution rhetoric to encompass the federal-state concept. 
However, they still needed a judicial precedent they could cite as authority to legitimize the 
extension of self-execution doctrine into the previously distinct realm of treaty supremacy. 
In the field of U.S. constitutional law, if a lawyer wants a precedent to support her 
position, she can find no better authority than an opinion by the great Chief Justice John 
Marshall. A legal claim gains instant legitimacy if the proponent cites a Marshall opinion as 
authority. In 1829, in a case called Foster v. Neilson, Marshall wrote that an NSE 
treaty “addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department; and the legislature must 
execute the contract before it can become a rule for the Court.”26 Foster involved a dispute over 
ownership of land in what is now Louisiana. The plaintiffs relied partly on a treaty to support 
their claim. The defendant’s claim was based on a land grant from the federal government. 
Foster said nothing about the relationship between treaties and state law because both parties 
relied exclusively on federal law to support their claims.27 Even so, in litigation involving the 
UN Charter’s human rights provisions in the early 1950s, lawyers began citing Foster to support 
the idea that an NSE treaty does not supersede conflicting state laws. By the late twentieth 
century, the underlying facts had been shrouded in the mists of time, so the judges who cited 
Foster as authority did not realize that Foster said nothing about the relationship between treaties 
and state law. Thus, in Medellín v. Texas—where the Supreme Court effectively authorized 
Texas to violate U.S. treaty obligations—Chief Justice Roberts relied heavily on Foster to 
support the Court’s decision.28 
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In sum, lawyers and judges in the early 1950s used the rhetoric of self-execution and the 
authority of Marshall’s opinion in Foster to create a novel NSE exception to the Constitution’s 
treaty supremacy rule.  With the exception of Quincy Wright, virtually nobody noticed that the 
newly minted NSE exception constituted a dramatic change from the mandatory treaty 
supremacy rule that prevailed from the Founding until about 1950. Thus, the de facto Bricker 
Amendment converted the treaty supremacy rule from a mandatory to an optional rule by means 
of a process of invisible constitutional transformation.  
 
The Politics of Transformation 
The transformation of the treaty supremacy rule was closely linked to the emergence of a 
new constitutional rule barring racial segregation. Both were revolutionary constitutional 
changes. Both were responses to the emergence of a new body of international human rights law.  
The United Nations Charter took effect in 1945; it codified a new international norm 
prohibiting racial discrimination. As a party, the United States is obligated to promote “human 
rights . . . for all without distinction as to race.”29 The United Nations adopted the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, which states: “Everyone is entitled to all the rights and 
freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other 
status.”30 Adoption of the Universal Declaration reinforced the importance of the norm against 
racial discrimination in the emerging post-war international order. As of 1948, the United States 
was one of the few countries in the world with a system of legally sanctioned racial segregation. 
Jim Crow laws in the South were the most notorious example, but various western states had 
discriminatory laws restricting land ownership,31 and states throughout the country used their 
judicial systems to enforce private agreements that maintained racially segregated housing.32 In 
light of the glaring discrepancy between U.S. laws and practices and the international norm 
against race discrimination, the United States came under intense pressure from the international 
community to abolish race-based discrimination.33 If the United States wanted to win the Cold 
War ideological battle with the Soviet Union, it would have to put an end to the uniquely 
American form of apartheid. 
Shortly after the Charter took effect, lawyers in the United States began invoking the 
Charter’s human rights provisions in domestic litigation. Between 1946 and 1954, U.S. courts 
decided dozens of cases in which civil rights plaintiffs invoked the Charter’s human rights 
provisions to challenge discriminatory state laws.34 The combination of international pressure 
and domestic civil rights litigation sparked a process of “acculturation” in the United States. 
Professors Goodman and Jinks define acculturation as “the general process by which actors 
adopt the beliefs and behavioral patterns of the surrounding culture.” The touchstone of 
acculturation, they say, “is that varying degrees of identification with a reference group generate 
varying degrees of cognitive and social pressures to conform.” Goodman and Jinks emphasize 
the “civilizing force of hypocrisy” as a crucial element in explaining how the process of 
acculturation can yield deep, meaningful human rights reform. They claim that “acculturation 
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narrows the gap between public acts and private preferences through internal cognitive 
processes: Under certain conditions people change their beliefs to avoid the unpleasant state of 
cognitive dissonance between what they profess in public and what they believe in private.”35 
Cognitive dissonance and the civilizing force of hypocrisy were key factors driving 
constitutional transformation in the United States between 1946 and 1954. Indeed, the Supreme 
Court’s landmark 1954 decision in Brown v. Bd. of Education, holding that racial segregation in 
public schools is unconstitutional, was a product of acculturation. Brown can be explained as a 
decision to incorporate into the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause the strong anti-
discrimination norm codified in the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
The parties litigated Brown in tandem with its companion case, Bolling v. Sharpe. Bolling 
involved racial segregation in public schools in the District of Columbia. Petitioners in Bolling 
presented a detailed argument to the effect that racial segregation in public schools violated the 
UN Charter’s anti-discrimination provisions.36 The United States filed a key amicus brief in 
Brown and Bolling, arguing that continued racial discrimination in the United States hindered 
accomplishment of the nation’s foreign policy goals. The government’s brief emphasized that 
continued racial segregation at home undermined the nation’s effort to win the Cold War 
ideological battle with the Soviet Union.37 In light of the arguments presented, the Court had 
three basic options in Brown and Bolling. First, it could have adhered to established precedent 
under the “separate but equal” doctrine and held that state and local laws permitting racial 
segregation in public schools were valid. Second, it could have invalidated state and local laws 
by applying the UN Charter in conjunction with the Supremacy Clause. Both these options were 
unsatisfactory because, as one contemporary commentator noted, it would be “a reproach to our 
constitutional system to confess that the values it establishes fall below any requirement of the 
Charter.”38 Not wanting to reproach our constitutional system, the Court selected the third 
option: it repudiated the doctrine of “separate but equal” and held that racial segregation in 
public schools violates the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause (Brown) and the 
Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause (Bolling).39 The third option was the only option that 
allowed the Justices “to avoid the unpleasant state of cognitive dissonance between what they 
profess in public and what they believe in private.”40 The Justices believed privately in American 
exceptionalism: the view that the United States has the best constitution in the world. In light of 
the newly emerging international norm prohibiting race-based discrimination, the Justices could 
not reconcile their faith in American exceptionalism with the reality of racial segregation. So, 
they reinterpreted the Constitution to incorporate the UN Charter’s strong anti-discrimination 
norm into the Equal Protection Clause. 41 
As other scholars have explained, Brown is properly viewed as a mid-point, not the end-
point, of the civil rights revolution in the United States.42 Just as the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1954 
decision in Brown was a critical turning point in the transformation of the Equal Protection 
Clause, the California Supreme Court’s decision in Fujii v. State was a critical turning point in 
the transformation of the treaty supremacy rule.43 The plaintiff in Fujii was a Japanese national 
who bought land in California. California’s Alien Land Law barred Japanese nationals from 
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owning land in California. Mr. Fujii filed suit to challenge the validity of the California statute. 
In a landmark ruling in April 1950, a lower court held that the Alien Land Law was invalid 
because it conflicted with the UN Charter’s human rights provisions and the Charter trumped 
California law under the Supremacy Clause.44  
The lower court’s decision in Fujii was legally sound, but politically explosive.45 Even 
before the Fujii decision, leaders of the American Bar Association (ABA) had been lobbying 
vigorously against U.S. participation in international human rights treaties. By the time the 
California court issued its decision, the ABA was officially on record opposing U.S. ratification 
of the Genocide Convention, and opposing U.S. participation in the International Covenant on 
Human Rights, which was then in draft form. Fujii persuaded the ABA leadership that more 
drastic action was necessary. In September 1950, the ABA authorized a study of possible 
constitutional amendments to avert the perceived threat posed by international human rights 
treaties. Fujii also provoked a strong response from the U.S. Senate. In September 1951, Senator 
John Bricker introduced the first of several versions of a proposed constitutional amendment that 
came to be known as the Bricker Amendment. Like the ABA proposal, the Bricker Amendment 
was designed to address the perceived threat posed by international human rights treaties.46 
In an effort to counter the political momentum supporting the Bricker Amendment, 
lawyers who favored U.S. ratification of human rights treaties began to invoke NSE doctrine. In 
particular, they argued that the draft Covenant on Human Rights could be rendered non-self-
executing by including appropriate language in the treaty itself, or in unilateral reservations 
attached to the treaty. Lawyers presented this argument in internal debates within the ABA. 
Senior officials in the Eisenhower Administration made similar arguments during Senate 
testimony in hearings on the proposed Bricker Amendment. By invoking NSE doctrine in this 
way, they hoped to demonstrate that international human rights law was not as threatening as 
Senator Bricker and the ABA leadership claimed. However, by applying NSE doctrine in this 
manner, they obscured the critical distinction between treaty supremacy doctrine (which had 
previously governed the relationship between treaties and state law) and self-execution doctrine 
(which had previously governed the distribution of power over treaty implementation among the 
branches of the federal government). In the process, they created a novel NSE exception to the 
Constitution’s treaty supremacy rule.47 
Fujii illustrates this point. On appeal to the California Supreme Court, the California 
Attorney General argued that the UN Charter did not “supersede” the Alien Land Law because 
the Charter is not self-executing.48 The California Supreme Court accepted this argument. It said: 
“A treaty . . . does not automatically supersede local laws which are inconsistent with it unless 
the treaty provisions are self-executing.”49 The court then analyzed the UN Charter’s human 
rights provisions, concluding that they are not self-executing.50 The holding that the Charter is 
not self-executing enabled the court to dodge the uncomfortable question whether the Alien Land 
Law violated the Charter’s human rights provisions.51 It bears emphasis that the California 
Supreme Court was not concerned about the division of power over treaty implementation 
among the branches of the federal government, which was the traditional focus of self-execution 
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doctrine. Instead, the court applied NSE doctrine to protect California’s autonomy, as a 
sovereign state, from the “foreign” influence of the Charter’s human rights provisions. This was 
a very different concept of non-self-execution than any court had ever applied before. Fujii was 
the first published decision by any state or federal court in U.S. history that applied NSE doctrine 
to support a decision that a treaty did not supersede conflicting state laws. 
The American Law Institute (ALI) published the Restatement (Second) of Foreign 
Relations Law in 1965. The Restatement effectively codified the NSE exception to the treaty 
supremacy rule that the California Supreme Court articulated in Fujii (in 1952), and that the 
Eisenhower Administration endorsed in Senate testimony on the proposed Bricker Amendment 
(in 1953). After 1965, judges and scholars accepted the NSE exception to the treaty supremacy 
rule on the strength of the ALI’s authority. 
Why did American lawyers accept the NSE exception to the treaty supremacy rule? Four 
factors help answer this question. First, reliance on the authority of Foster v. Neilson, combined 
with confusion about the proper definition of the term “non-self-executing,” concealed the 
expansion of self-execution doctrine to encompass the previously distinct doctrine of treaty 
supremacy. Consequently, most of the lawyers responsible for the de facto Bricker Amendment 
probably did not realize that the NSE exception to the treaty supremacy rule was a dramatic 
departure from prior law. Second, President Eisenhower was firmly opposed to the proposed 
Bricker Amendment. Creation of an NSE exception to the treaty supremacy rule helped the 
Eisenhower Administration defeat the Bricker Amendment in the Senate, because the NSE 
exception supported the Administration’s argument that human rights treaties were not as 
threatening as Senator Bricker feared. Third, the United States was engaged in a Cold War 
ideological battle with the Soviet Union, and the Soviets were exploiting every available 
opportunity to criticize racist policies and practices in the United States. In cases like Bolling and 
Fujii, a judicial holding that state law did not comply with the Charter’s human rights provisions 
would have caused a major diplomatic embarrassment for the nation. NSE doctrine conveniently 
allowed the courts to avoid that embarrassment by ducking the question whether state law 
conflicted with the Charter. 
Finally, cases like Bolling and Fujii created severe cognitive dissonance for American 
lawyers and judges. If courts applied the UN Charter and traditional treaty supremacy doctrine to 
invalidate discriminatory state and local laws, they would have been tacitly admitting that the 
Charter provided stronger protection against racial discrimination than did the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Such an admission would have been contrary to their faith in American 
exceptionalism. To address that cognitive dissonance, the California Supreme Court in Fujii and 
the U.S. Supreme Court in Brown and Bolling reinterpreted the Fourteenth Amendment to 
incorporate the UN Charter’s strong anti-discrimination norm into the Equal Protection Clause. 
Meanwhile, the Fujii court endorsed an NSE exception to the treaty supremacy rule. The NSE 
exception helped judges preserve their faith in American exceptionalism by enabling them to 
duck the uncomfortable question whether international human rights law provides stronger 
protection for human rights than does the U.S. Constitution. In cases where it appears that the 
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answer is “yes,” courts preferred to reinterpret the Fourteenth Amendment to satisfy international 
human rights standards, rather than applying the treaty supremacy rule. 
 
Organization of the Book 
The remainder of the book is divided into four parts. Part One addresses treaty supremacy 
in the Founding era. The analysis is fairly abbreviated. Part One touches briefly on the Articles 
of Confederation, the Federal Convention, the state ratification debates, and the first decade after 
adoption of the Constitution. The reason for brevity is not that the Founding era is unimportant. 
Rather, the reason for brevity is that there is no significant scholarly disagreement regarding the 
book’s central claim about the Founding era. At that time, all key participants understood that 
treaty supremacy addressed the relationship between treaties and state law, whereas non-self-
execution was a federal separation of powers doctrine. Therefore, no influential member of the 
Founding generation advocated an NSE exception to the treaty supremacy rule.52 
Part Two covers the period from 1800 to 1945. In contrast to Part One, this part attempts 
to be fairly comprehensive. Comprehensiveness is necessary to debunk the myth that there was 
an NSE exception to the treaty supremacy rule before 1945. The lawyers, judges and scholars 
who carried out a successful constitutional revolution after World War II did a remarkably good 
job of perpetrating that myth. Because falsehoods are buried deeply in contemporary 
understandings of the relevant legal history, quite a bit of excavation is needed to uncover the 
truth. The final chapter of Part Two discusses social, political, and intellectual developments 
between 1900 and 1945 that laid the groundwork for the ensuing constitutional transformation. 
Part Three analyzes the period from 1945 to 1965. Whereas Part Two focuses heavily on 
courts, Part Three is primarily concerned with developments outside the courts. The American 
Bar Association (ABA), the American Law Institute (ALI), civil rights organizations, and the 
U.S. Senate feature prominently in this part of the story. In brief, the birth of modern 
international human rights law unleashed a torrent of human rights activism in both domestic and 
international fora. That human rights activism, in turn, sparked a strong political backlash in the 
United States. The backlash generated substantial political momentum in both the ABA and the 
U.S. Senate in favor of the proposed Bricker Amendment. Members of Washington’s foreign 
policy establishment joined forces with leading international lawyers to defeat the proposed 
amendment. That coalition produced a new version of NSE doctrine that helped reverse the 
momentum supporting the Bricker Amendment. A similar coalition of foreign policy 
professionals and international lawyers joined forces under the umbrella of the ALI to produce 
the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law. The Restatement codified the new NSE 
exception to the treaty supremacy rule as black letter law, thereby consolidating the process of 
constitutional transformation. 
Part Four addresses two questions. Chapter 14 discusses contemporary, doctrinal 
controversies related to self-execution and treaty supremacy. The history examined in Parts One 
to Three provides an alternative perspective to help illuminate certain doctrinal issues that are 
still hotly contested today. Chapter 15 discusses the implications of the de facto Bricker 
13 
 
Amendment for contemporary constitutional theory. I suggest that the phenomenon of invisible 
constitutional transformation is a subject that merits further study. Additionally, the story of the 
de facto Bricker Amendment injects a cautionary note into contemporary scholarship on 
“popular constitutionalism.” Whereas much of that scholarship celebrates constitutional change 
outside the courts as a triumph of democracy and popular sovereignty, the history of the de facto 
Bricker Amendment suggests that constitutional change outside the courts is not always 
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